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FINANCIAL DISPARITY AS EVIDENCE OF
DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE IX
ANNE BLOOM*
"[W]here there is no money, there is no change of any kind."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly fifteen years ago, the United States Civil Rights Commis-
sion recognized that "[f] acilities provided for women are often
inferior to those provided for men."2 Today, intercollegiate ath-
letic spending still heavily favors male athletes. A 1992 study found
that NCAA schools spend on average less than a fifth of their
recruiting funds and only about a quarter of their total athletic op-
erating monies on women's teams. 3 The same study found that ap-
propriation of athletic scholarship money between men and
women athletes is also unequal. 4
These general statistics are corroborated by institution-specific
information that has been made public in recent Title IX litigation.
For example, in litigation against Brown University - an institution
considered to have a good reputation for supporting women's
sports5 - the United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island found that men's sports at Brown consumed nearly three-
fourths of the total athletic operating budget.6 Similarly, Title IX
litigation against Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP) estab-
* Member of Trial Lawyers For Public Justice and counsel for plaintiff in
Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania.
1. Moss Hart, Acr O E (1959), quoted in Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888,
906 n.23 (1st Cir. 1993).
2. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PUB. No. 63, MORE HuDL s To CLEAR: Wo-
MEN AND GIRLs IN COMPETITIVE SPORTS 6 (1980).
3. See "NCAA Gender-Equity Study," National Collegiate Athletics Association,
March 1992.
4. Id. (finding that women receive from 20% to 42% of scholarship monies).
5. Andrew Szanton, On Balance, BROWN ALujm MONTHLY, Oct. 1993, at 21, 24
(quoting Kathryn Reith, [former] Assistant Executive Director of Women's Sports
Foundation). Reith explained that Brown is involved in Tide IX because there
"isn't blatant discrimination" at Brown. Id.
6. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 995 (D.R.I. 1992) (noting Brown's
total operating expenses for men's sports in 1990-91 were $726,378, as compared
to $293,798 for women), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
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lished that, for every $8.00 IUP spent on men's athletics, it spent
only $2.75 on women's athletics. 7
Despite the gross disparities, the issue of disparate financial re-
sources has been largely de-emphasized in the recent litigation over
school athletic programs. Instead, recent Title IX cases have fo-
cused on the rights of female athletes 'simply to participate in inter-
collegiate sports.8 As the first generation of Title IX lawsuits
proceeds to trial to address the issue of a presence or lack of wo-
men's teams on campus, every indication exists that the plaintiffs in
these cases will point more to evidence of financial disparity and
that courts will be asked to grant them relief that specifically ad-
dresses the lack of spending on women's athletics. 9 As current Tide
IX litigation compels schools to cease cutting women's teams to
comply with the participation aspects of Title IX, 10 the focus to ob-
tain gender equity in sports will almost certainly progress from sim-
ply wanting a female team to wanting a team that is fairly funded.
As a result, future litigation will focus more on the inequities in
funding and the quality of services provided to women's teams than
on the mere presence of a team or lack thereof.
As this trend develops, traditional defenses to Title IX actions
may become less effective. A common defense to charges of dis-
crimination under Title IX in the allocation of monies and services
in school athletic programs is that the money for the programs did
not come from federally allocated funds. For example, schools
might argue that the money spent for football did not come from
7. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally,
the court found that, despite the equal number of men's and women's varsity
teams, men constituted 62% of varsity athletes and 79% of the athletic scholar-
ships. Id.
8. Both the Favia and Cohen decisions, for example, followed motions for pre-
liminary injunctive relief by women athletes seeking to reinstate canceled women's
teams. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 579; Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 980. The district courts in
both cases ruled that, in order to obtain injunctive relief, plaintiffs need only
demonstrate that they were interested in continuing to play their sport and that
the number of female athletes competing at their institution is disproportionate to
the number of male athletes, in light of their respective enrollments. Favia, 812 F.
Supp. at 583; Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 990-91. In reviewing the Cohen case, the First
Circuit observed that "both the financial assistance and athletic equivalence stan-
dards are inapposite." Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897 n.12.
9. In granting plaintiffs' request for an injunction immediately reinstating
canceled women's teams, the Cohen court specifically stated that it would address
the alleged inequities in "benefits and services" when the case proceeds on the
merits. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 996.
10. SeeKelley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237, 240 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (not-
ing that compliance with Title IX and "gender equity" policy of The Big Ten Con-
ference were factors in University's decision to eliminate men's swimming team),
aftd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
[Vol. II: p. 5
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federal funds but from the revenues generated by the football pro-
gram. Today, such a defense holds little merit because university
monies must be evaluated as a whole, regardless of the source.11
For this reason, no exception exists for football or other revenue
producing sports. 12 Similarly, a constrained budget or cash
shortage is no excuse to a Title IX claim of gender inequity.'3
While Title IX does not require that institutions "pour ever-increas-
ing sums" into its athletic programs,1 4 it does require that once a
school decides to fund athletic programs, it must spend the money
equitably.
How will Title IX be applied in these cases? Is an educational
institution which is subject to Title IX required to achieve and
maintain financial parity in its men's and women's athletic pro-
grams? Where might an institution or a plaintiff's lawyer look for
violations of this aspect of Title IX?
This article addresses these issues and suggests that true com-
pliance with the letter and spirit of Title IX requires that colleges
and universities provide equal athletic opportunities not only in
terms of the number of sports offered to males and females, but
also in terms of equality in funding. To illustrate this point, the
article first examines the history of Title IX, the regulations promul-
gated thereunder and the various tests for measuring gender equity
in athletics. The article then examines the various factors used to
gauge financial funding disparities which a Title IX litigant may
come to use in a case against a school. These factors may become
an increasingly potent weapon for the Title IX plaintiff.
II. APPLYING TITLE IX TO DIsPARATE FUNDING IN ATHLETICS
A review of the legislative and regulatory history of Title IX
makes it clear that Title IX was intended to address a range of dis-
parate treatment, including inequities in funding for student ath-
letic programs. Passed in 1972, Title IX is a federal law that
prohibits sex discrimination at schools and universities that benefit
11. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 996 (rejecting Brown's argument that Brown Uni-
versity Sports Foundation monies should not be used in Title IX analysis).
12. Federal regulators have been unequivocal in stating that "[flootball or
other 'revenue producing' sports cannot be exempted from coverage of Title IX."
44 Fed. Reg. 71,421 (1979).
13. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 583 (W.D. Pa.) (noting
that statute does not provide an exception for schools confronting financial diffi-
culties) aftd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
14. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898-99 n.15 (1st Cir. 1993) (observ-
ing that subtraction and downgrading of opportunities for overrepresented gen-
der would be a valid course of university compliance).
1995]
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from federal financial assistance.' 5 In practice, the law covers the
"vast majority" of all colleges and universities.16 Although the lan-
guage of the statute itself says nothing about financial disparity in
school athletic programs,' 7 subsequent legislative activity demon-
strates that Congress intended Title IX to address specifically the
disparities in funding between men's and women's intercollegiate
athletics. 18
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
adopted regulations implementing Title IX on July 21, 1975.'9 The
regulations addressed, among other things, inequities in athletic
benefits.20 Subsequent hearings on the regulations also discussed
15. Title IX states that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance," with certain exceptions. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988).
16. Cohen. 991 F.2d at 893 (noting Title IX applies to all educational institu-
tions receiving federal financial support).
17. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
18. For example, in 1974 Senator John Tower introduced an amendment to
exempt all intercollegiate athletic programs from Title IX. See 120 CONG. REc.
15322-23 (1974) (proposing Amendment No. 1343 (May 20, 1974)). Subse-
quently, the amendment was modified to exempt only revenue-producing sports.
Id. Both of these amendments failed, signalling Congress' intent that Title IX be
construed to address discriminatory funding in intercollegiate athletics. Congress
ultimately adopted the alternative "Javits" amendment which only required that
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare promulgate regulations "with
respect to intercollegiate athletic activities [include] reasonable provisions con-
cerning the nature of particular sports" such as contact sports. S. CONF. REP. No.
10, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4271 (1974).
19. See 45 C.F.R § 86.41 (1975).
20. Id. The regulations state:
Equal Opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholas-
tic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal ath-
letic opportunity for members of both sexes. In determining whether
equal opportunities are available the Director will consider, among other
factors:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effec-
tively accommodate the interests and abilities of the members
of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal ex-
penditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors
separate teams will not constitute non-compliance with this section, but
the Director may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for
[Vol. II: p. 5
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the disparity in funding between men's and women's athletic pro-
grams.21 In both the regulations and the hearings, Title IX would
be construed to address these disparities.22 In 1979, the Office of
Civil Rights (OCR) of HEW issued a "Policy Interpretation" of Title
IX and its requirements.23 The Policy Interpretation addresses the
issue of disparate funding for men's and women's teams in both
general and specific terms. The Policy Interpretation is an official
agency interpretation. Therefore, it should be accorded substantial
deference by the courts.24
According to the Policy Interpretation, satisfaction of Title IX
requires that "the availability, quality and kinds of benefits, oppor-
tunities, and treatment" afforded to male and female student ath-
letes be equal or "equal in effect."2 5 Significantly, the Policy
Interpretation also states that Title IX does not require equal ex-
penditures for male and female teams, so long as the programs are
essentially equal. 26 OCR's interpretation of Title IX does not focus
on how much an institution spends. Rather, the issue becomes
what the athletes receive in terms of opportunities. 27
teams for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of
each sex.
45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c).
21. At that time, female intercollegiate athletic programs were receiving only
two percent of what men's programs were receiving. Sex Discrimination Regulations:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondawy Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1975) (statement of Rep. Stewart B. McKinney).
22. Id. at 439 (finding by Caspar W. Weinberger, [former] Secretary, Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare).
23. Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413-23 (1979). In 1979, HEW split
into the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Department
of Education (DED). See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993).
Subsequently, the DED became the principal enforcer of Title IX. Id.
24. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984), cited in Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895. As the First Circuit noted in the
Cohen case, "[t] he degree of deference is particularly high in Title IX cases because
Congress explicitly delegated to the agency the task of prescribing standards for
athletic programs under Tide IX." Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895; see Chevron, 467 U.S. at
844 (stating Congress has explicitly delegated rulemaking power to agency; regula-
tions prescribed under such power deserve "controlling weight").
25. 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,415.
26. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1992), cited in Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896 n.9 (noting
that unequal expenditures for separate teams does not violate Tide IX per se, but
DED may consider such disparity in assessing equality of opportunity).
27. Although the Policy Interpretation does not consider unequal aggregate
expenditures alone to be sufficient to violate Title IX, the United States Civil
Rights Commission has acknowledged that "[olne important measure of the ex-
tent to which colleges treat men and women equally is the amount of money budg-
eted for men's and women's athletic programs." U.S. COaMM'N ON Civr RIGHTS,
PUB. No. 63, MORE HURDLES TO CLEAR: WOMEN AND GIRLS IN COMPETrrIVE SPORTS
26 (1980).
1995]
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Although unequal aggregate expenditures alone do not consti-
tute a violation of Title IX, funding disparities should not be
ignored in a Title IX analysis. Where unequal aggregate expendi-
tures exist, an examination under Title IX involves investigating
how the money is being spent and determining the specific impact
of the unequal funding. Aggregate funding disparities can result
in noticeable programmatic differences in athletic opportunities
for men and women. In those instances, the differences can render
the overall program unfair, thus giving rise to a Title IX violation.
III. EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL DISPARITY AND PROVING
DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE IX
In order to examine the impact of unequal funding on an insti-
tution's compliance with Title IX, one must delve into a full-scale
compliance analysis as set out in the OCR's Policy Interpretation.
The Policy Interpretation sets out three general categories of dis-
crimination in athletic programs under Title IX.28 These three ar-
eas are the following: (1) Effective Accommodation of Student
Interests and Abilities, 29 (2) Equivalence in Other Athletic Benefits
and Opportunities,30 and (3) Athletic Financial Assistance or Schol-
arships. 3' Non-compliance in any one of these three areas is a viola-
tion of Title IX.32 Evidence of disparities in funding for men's and
28. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-17.
29. Id. at 417; see 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1). The Director of the OCR will con-
sider whether "selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommo-
date the interests and abilities of members of both sexes" in determining whether
equal opportunities are available. Id.; see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888,
897-98 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing "Effective Accommodation" part of Policy
Interpretation).
30. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415; see 34 C.F.R1 § 106.41(c) (2-10) (outlining factors as-
sociated with maintenance of athletic programs which the Director may consider
in determining whether equal opportunities are available); see also Cook v. Colgate
Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737, 744-45 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (analyzing whether equivalence
exists in other athletic benefits and factors at Colgate University), vacated, 992 F.2d
17 (2d Cir. 1993).
31. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415; see 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) (awards of scholarships or
grants-in-aid must be proportionate to number of students of each sex participat-
ing in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics); see also Favia v. Indiana Univ. of
Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 582 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (noting disproportionate scholarship
awards at IUP).
32. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D. Colo. 1993),
("[A] violation of Tide IX may be shown by proof of a substantial violation in any
of the three major areas of investigation set out in the Policy Interpretation.")
modified sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.
1993); see Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584 (implying plaintiff establishes Tide IX viola-
tion by proving one of three prongs); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 984
(D.R.I. 1992) (discussing three elements of OCR Policy Interpretation), afj'd, 991
F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
[Vol. II: p. 5
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women's programs are relevant to proving a violation under all
three categories.3
3
A. Effective Accommodation of Student Interests and Abilities3 4
The "effective accommodation" prong delineates the "heart-
land" of Title IX and its charge to ensure "[e]qual opportunity to
participate."35 Perhaps for this reason, it has also been the primary
"battleground" for Title IX litigation.3 6 To date, evidence of finan-
cial disparity has been offered largely as background evidence
under this prong to help the court understand the environment of
discrimination in which women's teams were cut.3 7 In future cases,
however, evidence of inadequate funding of the underrepresented
gender may be used directly to demonstrate failure to accommo-
date student interests and abilities.
In Cohen, the First Circuit appropriately followed what has been
described as a "trinitarian" model for determining whether an insti-
tution's athletic program effectively accommodates students' inter-
ests and abilities.38 Under this framework, to defeat a Title IX
33. See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 343 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting
that unequal aggregate expenditures does not automatically result in a finding of
non-compliance under Title IX). However, a school's failure to provide funds for
teams of one sex may be considered as a factor in assessing Title IX violations. Id.
34. The fact that OCR reserved an entire section for effective
accommodations within its Policy Interpretation serves as a good indication of its
relative importance in addressing compliance under Title IX. Jill K.Johnson, Title
IX & Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial Interpretations of the Standard for
Compliance, 74 B.U. L. Rxv. 553, 566 (1994).
35. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993) (observing that
institutions can violate Title IX even if they meet "financial assistance" and "ath-
letic equivalence" statutory standards).
36. Id. at 897; see also Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824,
831 (10th Cir. 1993) (analyzing district court's findings under "effective accommo-
dation" prong); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 585 (W.D. Pa.)
(finding that continuing scholarship commitments to female athletes and provid-
ing assistance to athletes in transferring to other schools after cutting teams is not
effective accommodation), affd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
37. The lack of emphasis on funding disparities may stem partly from the
defendant schools' inadequate participation numbers which, even without evi-
dence of discrimination in funding, are enough to justify the initial relief the wo-
men sought - reinstatement of canceled women's teams. See Favia v. Indiana
Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting women make up 55.6% of
student body but receive only 38% of participation opportunities); Cohen, 991 F.2d
at 892 (women make up 48% of student body but receive 36.6% of athletic
opportunities).
38. The First Circuit concluded that "a Title IX plaintiff makes out an athletic
discrimination case by proving numerical disparity, coupled with unmet interest,
each by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence, so long as the defendant
does not rebut the plaintiff's showing by adducing preponderant history-and-prac-
tice evidence." Cohen, 991 F.2d at 902.
7
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challenge under the accommodation prong, an institution must
demonstrate one of the following:
(1) gender parity between the student body and the ath-
letic lineup,39
(2) a history of continually expanding athletic opportuni-
ties for the underrepresented gender, or
(3) a demonstrable lack of interest on the part of the un-
derrepresented gender.40
Although proving discrimination under the accommodation prong
focuses on the actual numbers of men and women participating in
a school's athletic programs, evidence of funding disparities are
highly relevant, particularly if an institution can not demonstrate
gender parity between the student body and athletic participation
rates.
For example, if an institution has more female students en-
rolled than male students but has a greater percentage of males
participating in sports, the institution will not be able to satisfy the
accommodation prong by demonstrating gender parity. In such in-
stances, the institution will be forced to defend a Title IX challenge
either by pointing to a continuing expansion of athletic opportuni-
ties for females at the institution or by attempting to prove that the
female students are less interested in sports. Because of the long
history of discrimination against women in athletic programs, an
institution may have difficulty in demonstrating that it has ade-
quately expanded opportunities or met women's interests in partici-
pating in sports when the women's athletic program continues to
receive significantly less funding. Under this theory, a university
could be held liable for failing to spend adequate amounts of
money to encourage female participation in athletics.
This is not a novel approach to evaluating an institution's com-
pliance under the accommodation prong. As early as 1980, the
United States Civil Rights Commission acknowledged that "rela-
tively less money allocated [to] women's programs" may limit the
number of female athletes and "discourage" participation. 41 More
recently, a federal district court hearing a Title IX case considered
39. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that an
institution will not be in violation of Tide IX if the plaintiff only establishes non-
compliance based on lack of proportionality between the sexes). Noncompliance
requires that the institution fails to meet one of the three prongs. Id.
40. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
41. U.S. COMM'N ON CiWL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that lack of op-
portunity discourages women from playing sports).
[Vol. 11: p. 5
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the inadequate funding of women's teams in assessing "equality of
opportunity" under the accommodation prong of Tide IX.42
In Cohen, Brown University permitted two women's teams, for-
merly varsity teams, to continue as intercollegiate clubs "but cut off
financial subsidies and support services routinely available to varsity
teams (e.g., salaried coaches, access to prime facilities, preferred
practice time, medical trainers, clerical assistance, office support,
admission preferences, and the like)."43 The trial court reinstated
these women's teams to varsity status and commented that the "bot-
tom line [was] that Brown [knew] full well that the two women's
teams [would] not be able to effectively compete at an intercollegi-
ate level without varsity status, recruitment assistance, and some
type of guaranteed funding arrangement by the university."44 As a
result of this decision, the creation of "major" and "minor" sports,
where more male athletes are playing more major sports than fe-
male athletes, is impermissible. 45 Courts understand the connec-
tion between participation rates and adequate funding. In fact, the
Cohen court recognized what football recruiters have known for de-
cades: interest and ability do not thrive in a vacuum. 46 How much
a school spends directly affects participation rates and competition
levels.
Significantly, in Haffer v. Temple University,47 the first case that
attempted to apply Title IX to intercollegiate athletics, the plaintiffs
presented expert testimony connecting athletic interest and ability
with the amount of money devoted to athletic scholarships, recruit-
ing and publicity.48 In future Title IX litigation, plaintiffs should
use similar testimony to demonstrate that their low participation
42. See Cohen, 809 F. Supp. 978, 994 (noting that Department of Health &
Human Services regulations allow Department of Education to consider failure to
fund teams of one sex in assessing equality of opportunity), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st
Cir. 1993).
43. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892.
44. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 993 (observing that Brown athletic officials admit-
ted that intercollegiate club status is a "step down" from varsity status).
45. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 71,422 (noting that no subgrouping of male or fe-
male students may be used to diminish rights of larger class of males and females
to equal participation in educational benefits or opportunities).
46. U.S. COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 5 ("Low participation rates
... are more a reflection of lack of opportunity and fear of being thought 'mascu-
line' than lack of interest.").
47. 678 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
48. Haffer, 678 F. Supp. at 526. The court noted that the number of students
who want to compete in intercollegiate athletics and have the requisite skills is
directly related to money devoted to scholarships, advertising, promotion and
sports information activities. Id.
1995]
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rates are caused by the university's failure to invest enough money
in the program to stimulate interest and participation.
B. Equivalence in Other Athletic Benefits and Opportunities
While the accommodation prong focuses on participation
rates, the "other athletic benefits and opportunities" prong ad-
dresses the mechanics of maintaining athletic programs. As a re-
sult, this is the most obvious area to look for the effects of unequal
funding in the form of gender-based discrepancies in the provision
of athletic benefits and opportunities.
The Policy Interpretation notes ten criteria, including effective
accommodation, that are relevant in assessing discrimination under
the provision of athletic benefits and opportunities.49 In addition,
two other criteria are listed under "Application of the Policy."50 In
order to provide greater specificity as to what each of these criteria
entail, federal regulators also identified "components" for each of
the criteria.5 1 Although courts have not yet adopted these criteria,
they probably will adopt them in light of the strong deference to
agency interpretations of Title IX. 5 2 The key word for compliance
with these factors is "equivalence."53
49. These factors are set out in the regulations under Title IX. The factors
are: (1) effective accommodation, (2) equipment and supplies, (3) scheduling,
(4) travel and per diem allowance, (5) opportunity to receive coaching and aca-
demic tutoring, (6) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors, (7) pro-
vision of locker rooms, (8) provision of medical and training facilities, (9)
provision of housing and dining facilities and (10) publicity. 34 C.F.R
§ 106.41(c). The Policy Interpretation also discusses recruitment of student ath-
letes and provision of support services, noting that the Director of the OCR has the
authority to consider other factors in the "equal opportunity" analysis. 44 Fed.
Reg. 71,415.
50. The Application of the Policy lists recruitment of student athletes and
support services as additional criteria in considering discrimination in the provi-
sion of athletic benefits and opportunities. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,417.
51. Id. at 71,416.
52. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993). The First
Circuit noted that "appreciable deference" must be given to the Department of
Education's interpretation of Title IX. Id.
53. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 ("[I] nstitutions will be in compliance if the compared
program components are equivalent, that is, equal or equal in effect.").
[Vol. II: p. 5
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1. The Factors4
a. Equipment and supplies55
In addition to equivalency in the provision of apparel and
equipment, this factor requires equal access to "instructional de-
vices" and "conditioning and weight training equipment."5 6 Unless
the school can demonstrate a non-discriminatory reason for differ-
ences, all aspects of equipment provisions must be equivalent, in-
cluding the "quality, quantity, suitability, availability, maintenance
and replacement."57 Under this factor, investigations are con-
ducted to determine how frequently uniforms are replaced, 58 who
pays for the equipment59 and who pays for equipment repair for
men's and women's teams. 60
b. Scheduling of games and practice times61
Universities have a long-standing practice of giving men's
teams more desirable practice times and more opportunities to
compete than women's teams.62 Tide IX regulations require that
men's and women's programs receive equivalent treatment con-
cerning (1) the number, scheduling and location of games or com-
petitive opportunities, (2) the opportunities to practice, including
the length and scheduled times of practice, and (3) the opportuni-
ties to engage in pre-season and post-season competition. 6 This
54. The listed factors do not include the effective accommodation factor. For
a discussion of effective accommodation, see supra notes 34-48 and accompanying
text.
55. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) (2); see, e.g., Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737,
744-45 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (evaluating disparities in equipment provisions between
men's and women's ice hockey teams at Colgate University), vacated, 992 F.2d 17
(2d Cir. 1993).
56. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,416; see, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 996
(D.R.I. 1992) (noting plaintiffs produced "scattered evidence" on the equipment
and supplies factor), aTd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
57. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,416.
58. See, e.g., Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 996. The Cohen court considered testimony
that the men's ice hockey team received new uniforms every one or two years,
while the women's ice hockey team received new uniforms every four or five years.
Id.
59. See; e.g., Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 744. The court considered in Cook the fact
that the men's ice hockey team received free skates while the women's team did
not. Id.
60. Id.
61. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c) (3) (1992).
62. See, e.g., Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 745 (giving men "prime" practice times,
while women's practice times were sometimes preempted by men's team practice
or by other activities is considered in determining Title IX violations).
63. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,416(b).
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factor reflects the cornerstone underlying Title IX regulations
which maintains that gender-based discrepancies are plainly
unacceptable.
c. Travel and per diem allowances 64
Not very long ago, men's collegiate teams received more
money for food and better hotel accommodations than women's
teams when the teams traveled out of town to play away games. 65
Title IX prohibits such differences unless they can be explained by
some non-discriminatory cause. Federal regulations specifically
identify modes of transportation, housing furnished during travel,
length of stay before and after competitive events, per diem al-
lowances and dining arrangements as appropriate areas for review
under this factor.66
Does the men's baseball team always receive bus transportation
to away games while the women's softball team carpools? Does the
institution have a "football" table in the dining hall but no
equivalent dining arrangement for a women's athletic team? While
these examples by themselves are not necessarily violations of Title
IX, such discrepancies pose problems for an institution that can not
provide any non-discriminatory reason for the differences in
treatment.
d. Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring67
The Policy Interpretation states that compliance under this fac-
tor requires equivalence regarding the availability of graduate assist-
ants and full-time, part-time and assistant coaches.68 In short,
female athletes should receive as much coaching as male athletes.
If there were disparate coach-to-athlete ratios that could not be ex-
plained by any non-discriminatory reason, the institution would vio-
late Title IX. Similarly, the availability of tutoring and the criteria
64. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (4).
65. In Haffer, the court acknowledged that the Temple University women's
badminton and softball teams were housed four or five to a room while traveling,
whereas men's basketball and football teams were housed only two to a room. Haf-
fer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 531 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
66. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,416.
67. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (5).
68. The regulation states:
(1) Coaching - Compliance will be assessed by examining, among other
factors, the equivalence for men & women of:
(a) Relative availability of full-time coaches;
(b) Relative availability of part-time and assistant coaches; and
(c) Relative availability of graduate assistants.
44 Fed. Reg. 71,416(c) (6) at 71,416(c) (1).
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and procedures for obtaining tutors for men and women athletes
must be equivalent. 69
e. Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors70
Similar to the "opportunity to receive coaching and academic
tutoring" factor, the components of this factor include the quality,
nature and availability of coaches. This benchmark also addresses
the coaches' and tutors' compensation per sport per season, dura-
tion of their contracts, conditions relating to contract renewal, their
experience, the nature of their duties and their working condi-
tions. 71 In addition, it would also be appropriate for a court to con-
sider disparities in housing, parking and other services such as
complementary automobiles and country club memberships that
are provided to coaches. 72 However, the one issue that will likely
become the subject of significant future litigation under Title IX
involves the effect of wide-spread discrepancies in salaries for the
coaches of men's and women's teams. 73 Plaintiffs should have little
difficulty presenting expert testimony proving that, when a univer-
sity pays its football coach three times more money than the field
hockey coach, the university has bought itself better quality coach-
ing for its male athletes. Universities will be hard-pressed to explain
the differences with anything other than pretextual explanations.
f. Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities74
This factor examines the quality and availability of athletic fa-
cilities. 75 It includes discrimination in the quality and maintenance
69. The regulation provides:
(2) Academic tutoring - Compliance will be assessed by examining,
among other factors, the equivalence for men and women of:
(a) The availability of tutoring; and
(b) Procedures and criteria for obtaining tutorial assistance.
Id. at 71,416(c) (2).
70. 34 C.F.RL § 106.41(c) (6).
71. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,416-17.
72. See, e.g., Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 582 (W.D. Pa.),
affd, 7 F.3d 332 (3rd Cir. 1993). The court found that several males on the ath-
letic staff received complimentary cars and memberships at local country club,
while female staff members did not receive such privileges. Id.
73. See General Accounting Office, Intercollegiate Athletics: Compensation Varies
for Selected Personnel in Athletic Departments (August 1992), at 2. This study has shown
that compensation disparities exist between men's and women's coaches. For in-
stance, the study found that "[h]ead coaches for women's basketball always had a
lower average compensation than head coaches for men's basketball." Id.; see also
NCAA Gender Equity Study: Summary of Results (March 1992), Table 4.
74. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) (7).
75. The regulation provides:
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of fields 76 and locker rooms77 as well as storage of team uniforms. 78
Under this factor, an institution may not provide female athletes
with fewer lockers, refuse to supply them with storage space or as-
sign them the least desirable fields. This factor is a significant
gauge of the level of athletic opportunities provided to each sex
because the facilities, including fields and stadiums, golf courses,
swimming pools or squash courts, are where the athletes practice,
compete and spend the bulk of their sporting experience.
g. Provision of medical and training facilities and services
79
This factor covers the provision of medical care, trainers,
health insurance and weight training and conditioning facilities.8 0
Some schools may attempt to justify spending more money on
men's teams in this area by arguing that men's sports are "high in-
jury" because some involve physical contact, such as football or
hockey, and therefore need extra money for medical services. This
(f) Provision of Locker Rooms, Practice and Competitive Facilities.
Compliance will be assessed by examining, among other factors, the
equivalence for men and women of:
(1) Quality and availability of the facilities provided for practice and
competitive events;
(2) Exclusivity of use of facilities provided for practice and competi-
tive events;
(3) Availability of locker rooms;
(4) Quality of locker rooms;
(5) Maintenance of practice and competitive facilities; and
(6) Preparation of facilities for practice and competitive events.
44 Fed. Reg. 71,417(f) (citations omitted).
76. In Favia, the court seems to consider the conditions of the men's baseball
field and women's softball fields in deciding whether IUP was in violation of Title
IX. The former associate director of athletics at IUP cited the disparate conditions
of the fields, inter alia, as evidence of IUP's violations of Tide IX. Favia v. Indiana
Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 582 (W.D. Pa.), af'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
77. The Cohen plaintiffs stated that the women's ice hockey locker room was
"significantly smaller than and inferior to the men's locker room." Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 997 (D.R.I. 1992), aftfd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir.
1993).
78. The Favia court considered the women's field hockey coach's testimony
that she kept the women's field hockey uniforms in the trunk of her car. Favia,
812 F. Supp. at 581.
79. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(8).
80. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,41 7 (g). The regulation states:
(g) Provision of Medical and Training Facilities and Services. Compli-
ance will be assessed by examining, among other factors, the equivalence
for men, and women of:
(1) Availability of medical personnel and assistance;
(2) Health, accident and injury insurance coverage;
(3) Availability and quality of weight and training facilities; and
(4) Availability and qualifications of athletic trainers.
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contention should be examined closely because some women's
sports, while not frequently involving physical contact, may also be
"high injury," such as women's gymnastics, and require additional
funding for medical services.
h. Provision of housing and dining facilities and services8l
The quality and availability of housing facilities, dining facili-
ties and services for athletes, while not a common means of gauging
gender equity in athletics, are also scrutinized as a significant part
of a Title IX analysis. This factor requires that an institution choos-
ing to house its football team in a high quality dorm must provide
comparable housing to a comparable percentage of women ath-
letes.8 2 In addition, under the OCR's Policy Interpretation, this fac-
tor is comprehensive and includes any "special services" which are
provided in conjunction with the housing, such as laundry, parking
and maid service.83
i. Publicity84
Under the "publicity" factor, the OCR's interpretation of Title
IX looks at access to publicity resources for male and female ath-
letes and the availability and quality of sports information person-
nel.8 5 The key issue is whether the school's public relations office is
allocating fairly its efforts between men's and women's athletic pro-
grams.8 6 Particulars of this factor include the time allocated be-
tween men's and women's athletic programs in the school trophy
case.8 7 One court looked at special incentives, such as drawings,
81. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) (9).
82. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,417.
83. Id.
84. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (10).
85. In relevant part, the regulation states:
(i) Publicity - Compliance will be assessed by examining, among other
factors, the equivalence for men and women of:
(1) Availability and quality of sports information personnel;
(2) Access to other publicity resources for men's and women's pro-
grams; and
(3) Quantity and quality of publications and other promotional de-
vices featuring men's and women's programs.
44 Fed. Reg. 71,417(i).
86. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 997 (D.R.I. 1992) (not-
ing that Brown's Sports Information Office devoted the "bulk of its attention" to
men's sports), affld, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F.
Supp. 517, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (recognizing evidence that men's teams receive
more publicity than women's teams).
87. See, e.g., 120 CONG. Rc. 16,400 (1974) (describing corridors of Ohio State
fieldhouse).
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that are used to increase attendance and heighten spectator inter-
est in attending games.88 Another court examined whether the
school was fair to women in allocating resources for newspaper cov-
erage of away events.8 9 All of these items receive review under the
"publicity" factor.90
j. Recruitment 9'
Another factor of importance in the Title IX equity analysis is
athlete recruitment. The analysis looks at whether the opportuni-
ties to recruit and the access to financial resources are "equivalently
adequate."92 In addition to requiring equality in recruiting efforts
and in funding for recruiting activities, Title IX prohibits universi-
ties from "hobbling a coach's effort to improve his or her team." 93
This factor also asks whether prospective students are treated simi-
larly regardless of their gender.94 Appropriate areas of inquiry in-
clude the distribution of overall funds for recruitment purposes, 95
the availability of cars to coaches for recruiting purposes96 and the
fairness in the allocation of "admission preferences." 97
88. In Favia, the United States District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania found: "At each home football game and basketball game a scholarship
for tuition for one semester is raffled off .... Although the women's basketball
games almost always are played immediately before the men's, the drawing for the
scholarship is conducted at half-time at the men's basketball games." Favia v. Indi-
ana Univ. Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 582 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
89. See Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 997 (noting testimony that only women's basket-
ball receives sports information coverage comparable to men's football, basketball
and ice hockey was indicative of Title IX violations).
90. For a discussion of the publicity factor, see supra note 85 and accompany-
ing text.
91. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,417. Recruitment is not addressed as a factor, per se. It is
listed under a separate section entitled "Application of the Policy." Id. However,
the court in Cohen specifically addressed the issue of recruitment and found that it
"is considered a target area in [Title IX] 'Policy Interpretation.' " Cohen, 809 F.
Supp. at 997.
92. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,417.
93. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 834 (10th Cir.
1993). However, it is interesting to note that universities do not, in turn, have to
offer scholarships to that team to aid a coach in improving his or her team. Id.
94. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,417.
95. See Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 997 (noting that data for 1990-91 indicated
men's teams received three times the amount of recruiting dollars as women's
teams).
96. At Brown, men's teams had a total of eleven cars, while only one women's
team had a single car. Id.
97. Although not specifically identified as a recruiting device, the Cohen court
noted Brown's argument that the University admissions practices have helped wo-
men gain participation opportunities to a greater degree. Id. at 991.
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k. Support services98
Title IX analysis also requires scrutiny of an institution's sup-
port services provided to men's and women's athletic programs. As-
sessing equivalence in support services requires an evaluation of the
amount of administrative, secretarial or clerical assistance provided
to men's and women's teams.99 The focus here is on examining a
key part of the athletic infrastructure of a university's sports pro-
gram. For example, the analysis determines whether office per-
sonnel sizes and long-distance telephone budgets are relatively
equal. 100
2. Program-Wide Analysis
Once the specific information under each of the factors is col-
lected, equivalency under the factors should be considered from a
program-wide perspective. 01 In other words, an institution may,
for example, provide extra publicity resources to its football team
only if the institution compensates for the discrepancy by providing
extra recruiting monies to the women's basketball team. If the
overall disparities are more than "negligible," the institution will be
in violation of Title IX unless the differences are caused by non-
discriminatory practices.' 02 Some non-discriminatory explanations
for disparities may include the unique aspects of particular sports
98. The Title IX regulation addressing support services states:
(b) Provision of Support Services. The administrative and clerical
support provided to an athletic program can affect the overall provision
of opportunity to male and female athletes, particularly to the extent that
they provided services which enable coaches to better perform their
coaching functions. In the provision of support services, compliance will
be assessed by examining, among other factors, the equivalence of:
(1) The amount of administrative assistance provided to men's and
women's programs;
(2) The amount of secretarial and clerical assistance provided to
men's and women's programs.
44 Fed. Reg. 71,417.
99. Id.
100. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 982 (noting Brown had "stripped the coaches of
women's teams of office space, long-distance telephone service and clerical
support").
101. The regulation provides in relevant part:
2. The Policy - The Department will assess compliance with both the re-
cruitment and general athletic program requirements of the regulation
by comparing the availability, quality and kinds of benefits, opportunities,
and treatment afforded members of both sexes. Institutions will be in
compliance if the compared program components are equivalent, that is,
equal or equal in effect.
44 Fed. Reg. 71,415(B) (2).
102. Id.
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(such as the added expense of managing the larger crowds at foot-
ball games or gymnastics competitions) or temporary imbalances
caused by fluctuations in team needs.108
In summary, the "athletic benefits and opportunities" prong
provides for a comprehensive review of an institution's athletic pro-
gram. If, after an overall review, an institution is not simply spend-
ing more money on men's teams but also is utilizing the money to
provide the men's teams with more opportunities and better serv-
ices, the institution is vulnerable to a Title IX challenge. 10 4
C. Athletic Financial Assistance and Scholarships
The third category of discrimination under the OCR's inter-
pretation of Title IX addresses athletic financial assistance and
scholarships. Title IX regulations require that institutions provide
"reasonable opportunities" for financial aid awards for members of
each sex "in proportion to the number of students of each sex par-
ticipating in . . . intercollegiate athletics."10 5 Put simply, athletic
scholarships must be proportionate to participation. 10 6 Courts will
look at the aggregate amounts awarded to female and male partici-
pants in order to determine whether a violation exists because Title
IX does not protect specific athletes or programs. 0 7 Perhaps the
simplest way to determine if a school is in compliance with the Ti-
tle IX requirements is to "divid[e] the amounts of aid available for
the members of each sex by the numbers of male or female partici-
pants in the athletic program and compar[e] the results."108 If the
amounts of money available for male and female participants is not
"substantially equal," then the school is violating Title IX unless the
institution can explain that the disparity is caused by a "legitimate,
non-discriminatory factor." 109 A memorandum issued by HEW to
school officials in September, 1975, further explained that if schol-
arships are not proportionate, they must be awarded on a sex-neu-
103. Id. at 71,415-16.
104. In some instances, a university may be providing men's programs with
more money, but because of the ingenuity of the directors of the women's pro-
grams, the programs are essentially equal. Under the OCR's interpretation of Ti-
tle IX, unequal aggregate expenditures do not, by themselves, violate Title IX;
therefore, this equality appears to be a permissible result. The seeming unfairness
of the result, however, combined with the complexity of the comprehensive ap-
proach, suggests that it may be wiser to simply compare overall aggregate funding.
105. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c).
106. 45 C.F.R. § 86.37(c).
107. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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tral basis, which means that scholarships must be awarded on the
basis of financial need, athletic ability or a combination of both."10
These criteria must be applied in a sex-neutral fashion to avoid a
discriminatory impact."'
At least one Title IX case has raised the issue of disparate fund-
ing in athletic scholarships. In Favia, the plaintiffs alleged, inter
alia, that IUP discriminated against women athletes in the alloca-
tion of athletic scholarships. 12 The trial court found that, before
program reductions, female athletes constituted 37.77% of the total
athletes and received 21% of the scholarship money awarded.113
These numbers plainly suggest a violation of Tide IX for which the
court may award relief unless IUP can demonstrate that the dispar-
ity is caused by a legitimate, non-discriminatory factor. Signifi-
candy, the IUP plaintiffs need not prove that they are entitled to
additional participation opportunities to prove a violation under
this category because, even at existing levels of participation, IUP is
not providing its female athletes with proportionate scholarship
monies. 114
A financial aid violation would also appear to exist when the
reduction in financial aid is a result of low female participation that
has been discriminatorily reduced. 115 This makes for a more diffi-
cult case because the plaintiffs would first need to prove that the
university has discriminated against them in the provision of actual
opportunities to participate" 6 as well as in the provision of finan-
cial aid.1' 7
110. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, OF-
FICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ELIMINATION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN ATHLETIC PROGRAMS:
MEMORANDUM TO CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS, SUPERINTENDENTS OF LOCAL EDU-
CATIONAL AGENCIES AND COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS 4 (1975).
111. Id.
112. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 580-82 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 7
F.3d 332 (3rd Cir. 1993).
113. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 580.
114. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 585. IUP had 313 male athletes and 190 female
athletes. Id. at 580. Male athletes received $246,755 in scholarship money, while
female athletes received $67,423. Id. at 582. Applying the Policy Interpretation
formula (dividing total aid per gender by total number of athletes for that gen-
der), the men at ]UP were receiving an average of $788 per athlete, while the
women received about $355.
115. See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (ob-
serving that participation figures resulting from unlawful discrimination under Ti-
de IX cannot justify summary judgment on Tide IX claim).
116. For a discussion of the effective accommodation prong of Tide IX, see
supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
117. One issue worthy of further discussion concerns whether the OCR's
practice of tying the provision of athletic scholarships to existing participation
rates makes sense. Under the present rule, a university arguably is prohibited from
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although the OCR's Policy Interpretation of Title IX suggests
that institutions can spend more on men's programs without neces-
sarily running afoul of Title IX, a closer examination of Title IX
compliance factors shows that the amount of money a school
spends on women's athletic programs is at the heart of compliance
with Title IX. As with most litigation, it still makes sense to pursue
the money.
As Title IX and its impact continues to be felt in the United
States, the use of the argument of disparate funding between male
and female athletic teams is likely to take on a more significant role
both in terms of shaping the basis of gender equity suits and for
providing another means to demonstrate the lack of gender equity
in collegiate athletics and a concomitant violation of Title IX.
using scholarships as a means of increasing female participation in their intercolle-
giate athletic programs. In other words, if female athletic participation is currently
20% at an institution where females make up 50% of the enrollment, a university
may be prohibited from offering females more than 20% of the scholarship money
in an effort to boost female participation rates. This seems unfair, particularly with
respect to those institutions that historically gave out more scholarship money to
men. A rule that would benefit females would allow universities to use scholarship
monies affirmatively to remedy the effects of past discrimination.
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